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RISK-SHARING AS A DETERMINANT OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE: 
INTERNAL FINANCING, DEBT, AND (OUTSIDE) EQUITY 
 








This paper proposes a historically-grounded mechanism-design model of corporate 
finance, with two-side risk aversion under limited contract enforceability, where (inside) 
equity held by entrepreneurs, debt and (outside) equity coexist. This capital structure shares 
optimally the non-diversifiable risk associated with costly and risky ventures. Furthermore, it 
uniquely sustains the optimal risk allocation if agents’ personal wealth is contractible at a 
higher enforcement cost than the projects’ returns.  Otherwise, the irrelevance theorem of 
Modigliani and Miller applies. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, we observe that (i) 
risk-averse merchants-entrepreneurs financed part of their ventures (hold inside equity) and 
raised additional funds from risk-averse investors through debt-like sea loan and equity-like 
commenda contracts when long-distance medieval trade was indeed highly costly and risky 
and that (ii) maritime insurance, with higher protection against the non-diversifiable “risk of 
loss at sea or from the action of men” but higher enforcement costs, did not develop until the 
mid-fourteenth century, when the ventures’ costs and risk had decreased significantly.     
Whereas the model emphasizes the entrepreneurs’ equity holdings and the limited-liability 
aspects of debt and equity, the choice between debt or equity derives from simple, although 
historically backed, information assumptions. The analysis is therefore complementary to 
other capital-structure theories based on agency costs, information asymmetries, signalling, 
transaction costs and incomplete contracting.  
 
Keywords:  debt contracts, capital structure, creditworthiness, enforceability, inside and 
outside equity, insurance, limited liability, private information, risk-sharing 
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“[T]he emphasis [of corporate ﬁnance] on large companies with dispersed investors has
underemphasized the role that diﬀerent ﬁnancing instruments can play to provide in-
vestors better risk diversiﬁcation. If all companies’ stock is held by well-diversiﬁed
investors, there is little need for additional diversiﬁcation. Unfortunately, this conve-
nient assumption does not seem to hold in practice.”
[Zingales, Journal of Finance, 55.4 (2000), p.1628]
“To judge the extent to which today’s methods of dealing with risk are either a beneﬁt
or a threat, we must know the whole story, from its very beginnings.”
[Bernstein, “Against the Gods. The Remarkable Story of Risk,” 1996, p.7]
For the last ﬁfty years or so Corporate Finance has focused on various departures from
the Modigliani and Miller’s theorem that make capital structure relevant to a ﬁrm’s value
under the assumption that economic agents are risk neutral (Harris and Raviv, 1991, Hart,
1995, and Freixas and Rochet, 1997, among others, survey this literature). Some models
take the form of the securities (contracts) issued by the ﬁrm, mainly debt and equity, as ex-
ogenously given; others endogenously derive the characteristics of debt and equity in terms
of cash ﬂows and/or control rights; but all predict a maximum inside participation rate
to the ﬁrms’ investments. Since contracts are chosen or designed exclusively to minimize
the costs associated with agency relations, information asymmetries, signaling, incomplete
contracting or transacting, the best an entrepreneur can do is to ﬁnance the project he
manages on its entirety, unless restricted to rely on external funds because of budget con-
straints. However, the evidence indicates that entrepreneurs/ﬁrms both are risk averse and
resort to external funds before investing 100 percent of their own wealth (for evidence on
these respects, see Zingales, 2000 and Zingales, 1995, table IV, p. 1439).
A notable exception is Leland and Pyle (1977). They exploit managerial risk aversion
to obtain a signaling equilibrium in which entrepreneurs retain a higher fraction of (inside)
equity than they would hold in the absence of adverse selection, but still rely on external
funds because of diversiﬁcation. Leland and Pyle thus rationalize the observed fact that
2entrepreneurs self-ﬁnance only a part of their ventures, but do not address the fundamental
question of why debt and equity are designed the way they are.
This paper oﬀers a mechanism-design model where (inside) equity held by entrepreneurs,
debt and (outside) equity emerge optimally under two-side risk aversion and limited contract
enforceability. To evaluate the empirical relevance of the model, the paper confronts its
assumptions and predictions with evidence from a historical episode in which risk-sharing
was unquestionably important. In particular, it investigates the ﬁnancial relations between
merchants and their potential ﬁnanciers in Venice during the Commercial Revolution from
the eleventh to the fourteenth centuries.
Like in Leland and Pyle (1977) and more generally the optimal portfolio selection theory
under risk aversion, entrepreneurs rely on external funds because of risk-sharing. Unlike
traditional capital structure theories, the speciﬁc form of contracts (securities) under which
funds are supplied is endogenously derived, but only in terms of cash-ﬂows. In fact, the
model is closest to the costly state veriﬁcation/falsiﬁcation literature (Townsend, 1979; and
Gale and Hellwig, 1985/Lacker and Weinberg, 1989) which, in a one-period comprehensive
contracting framework, derives the optimal income rights of debt or equity. However, it
diﬀers in its main assumptions and results.
In the model, all agents are risk-averse; each might be endowed with the resources
required to ﬁnance the venture by his own— so that entrepreneurs must not rely on external
funds because of budget constraints; there are both a downside risk and a commercial risk,
the former accounting for the possibility of losing part or all of the (ﬁxed) capital invested;
and there is no veriﬁcation/falsiﬁcation cost. On the contrary, the model considers two
exogenous information structures and introduces enforcement costs. Contracts are thus
designed to attain the optimal allocation of risk, given the information structure, while
minimizing enforcement costs.
3Whereas the model emphasizes the entrepreneurs’ equity holdings and the limited-
liability aspects of debt and equity, the choice between debt or equity is exogenously
driven by simple information assumptions: under hidden information debt emerges as a
second-best because contracts cannot be contingent on the non-veriﬁable commercial re-
turn; under full information ﬁrst-best equity contracts are possible. In contrast to the
costly state-veriﬁcation literature, in which the threat of veriﬁcation is not credible be-
cause veriﬁcation is ex-post ineﬃcient, debt is optimal under hidden information even if
stochastic veriﬁcation-bankruptcy schemes, like auditing, are allowed because the veriﬁca-
tion technology is exogenously given. Moreover, debt and equity can co-exist under diﬀerent
information structures and are robust to the allocation of bargaining power. However, the
model does not account for the equity’s linearity features, which would require introducing
some sort of enforcement (falsiﬁcation) cost. Last but not least, the model rationalizes the
observed fact that entrepreneurs hold inside equity but rely on debt and outside equity
before investing all their wealth in the projects they manage.
The paper ﬁrst considers the case in which the entrepreneur is constrained to rely on
external funds because of a shortage of his owns and delivers debt and equity as corner
solutions if and only if ventures are highly costly and risky. Because of the binding budget
constraint, the entrepreneur cannot repay any amount above the venture’s return, which
in case of loss is dreadfully insuﬃcient to reward the ﬁnancier’s capital investment. To
compensate for the possibility of losing his capital, the (risk-averse) ﬁnancier calls for soaring
payments otherwise. As a consequence, his consumption varies widely, whereas that of the
entrepreneur is invariably small. The lesser the amount paid out in the case of failure,
the higher the repayment required otherwise and the more volatile the ﬁnancier’s event-
consumption relative to the merchant’s. Because both agents are assumed to be equally
risk averse, the ﬁnancier values consumption in the event of loss relatively more than the
4entrepreneur, and it is optimal that the investor recoup as much of his capital as possible
from the venture’s return. In other words, debt and equity, with repayment equal to all
what is saved from a ﬁrm’s assets in case of failure, emerge optimally, one or the other
depending on the information structure. Yet, these contractual forms provide too much
insurance to the entrepreneur against the downside risk. Both the entrepreneur and his
potential ﬁnancier would prefer a contract with higher repayment in the case of loss, but
this is not feasible when the merchant lacks the resources required to fund the venture (debt
and equity are corner solutions).
The model is then extended to consider the case in which the entrepreneur is endowed
with suﬃcient capital to fund the venture on his own. From the observation that debt and
equity are corner solutions, it follows that a well-endowed entrepreneur will not optimally
raise funds for the whole trading venture through debt and equity, but will rather ﬁnance
part of the venture, thereby bearing the liability of loss for the corresponding amount and
eﬀectively receiving less insurance against the downside risk. In other words, a capital
structure with (inside) equity held by the entrepreneur, debt and (outside) equity shares
risk eﬃciently.
Yet, debt and equity are not the only contracts through which the optimal risk allocation
can be attained. The Modigliani and Miller irrelevance theorem, though, does not apply
because of enforcement cost. In particular, a capital structure with (inside) equity holdings
andlimitedliabilitydebtand/or(outside)equityispreferabletoacombinationofrisk-free
debt plus premium insurance because the cost of enforcing contracts contingent on the
ventures’ returns is assumed to be lower than from the agents’ personal wealth.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets the model and characterizes
various historically observed contracts. Sections 3 to 5 solve the contracting problem for
various parameter values and evaluate empirically various theoretical predictions generated
5by the model. Section 6 comments on the contract’s nominal indeterminacy and proposes
enforcement cost to determine a unique capital structure. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a one-period two-dates contracting economy with a merchant-entrepreneur and
a ﬁnancier who face the possibility to undertake a single welfare-enhancing investment
project, say a trading venture. Both agents are risk averse with preferences represented by
continuous and twice-diﬀerentiable utility functions Ui(ci) exhibiting a decreasing absolute
risk aversion (DARA) coeﬃcient with U0
i(.) > 0, U00
i (.) < 0, where c denotes consumption
and the subscript i = 1,2 stands for the merchant and the ﬁnancier, respectively.1 Each
agent i is initially endowed with ki units of good and maximizes his expected utility from
second-date consumption. Goods can be costlessly self-stored or invested in the trading
venture. Any amount of the good can be stored but the investment is lumpy. The venture
requires k units of investment, plus the entrepreneurship of the merchant. It yields a
random return s ∈ S = {y,x, ¯ x} with probability ps, where y denotes the loss due to the
downside risk and {x, ¯ x} stand for the risky commercial return, with 0 ≤ y  k  x < ¯ x
and k < E[s]. In the historical context under study, the downside risk refers to the so-called
“risk of sea and people” and includes the risk of natural shipwreck, piracy and conﬁscation
of property by foreign rulers. The commercial risk accounts for wide variations in proﬁts
depending on the tariﬀs and bribes paid in customs, transportation and storage fees, the
conditions of the goods upon arrival after hazardous trips, ﬂuctuations in prices, and so on
and so forth.
To account for the optimality of undertaking the investment project we assume that
E[Ui(s)] > Ui(k) ∀i, (1)
1Note that Innada conditions are not assumed to hold, so that we do not force and interior solution.
6which in combination with DARA ensures that the higher productivity of the trading
venture (E[s] > k) compensates for its risk. Therefore, agents will only self-store and
consume their autarkic endowments, ki, if they are unable to mobilize funds in long-distance
trade. For ease of notation, let w(s) = k1 + k2 − k + s be the second-date total risky
endowment of the economy when the venture is undertaken. We ﬁrst study the case in
which the merchant is constrained to rely on external funds because of budget constraints
and, for simplicity, he is assumed to have zero initial wealth, k1 = 0. Then, the model is
extended to capture the situation in which the merchant can ﬁnance the venture entirely
on his own, k1 > k. The ﬁnancier is always endowed with enough resources to fund the
venture, k2 > k.
At the ﬁrst date, when investment decisions are taken, there is no information whatso-
ever on the true realization of the venture return. At the second date the return is realized
and revealed to the merchant. Based on historical evidence, the model assumes that the
State both provides contract enforcement and can verify losses “at sea or from the action of
enemies,” and considers two extreme scenarios regarding the ability of the State to verify
the commercial return (Gonz´ alez de Lara, 2004a ). Under the hidden information structure
the commercial returns is non-veriﬁable, at any cost, but the State can force the merchant
pay out the minimum possible commercial return, x. Under the full information structure
the commercial return is veriﬁable without any private cost for the ﬁnancier.
Before proceeding, several comments are in order. First, to focus on the role that
ﬁnancial contracts can play in providing better risk-sharing, the model characterizes the
non-diversiﬁable risk associated with pre-modern long-distance trade. As a result, the
model does not reveal diversiﬁcation although, in reality, each trading venture entailed an
idiosyncratic risk that could be and actually was diversiﬁed to some extent. This leading
assumption is justiﬁed by the historical evidence, which clearly indicates that the presence
7of signiﬁcant indivisibilities and aggregate risk limited the degree of risk spreading that the
economy could achieve and prevented agents from eﬀectively becoming risk neutral.
Since evidence on the agents’ limited ability to diversify has been presented in detail
somewhere else (Gonz´ alez de Lara, 2004a ), a few examples will suﬃce here. The high
start-up cost associated with manning and outﬁtting a typical medieval ship— with a crew
of a hundred and about 200 tons capacity during the thirteenth century— prevented the
undertaking of a suﬃciently large number of ventures during a period in which capital was
the more scarce. Furthermore, since the few ventures that were actually ﬁnanced concen-
trated on the most proﬁtable Levantine trade, they were exposed to the aggregate risk of
having their proceeds impounded by a politically hostile ruler, as it happened in 1171 when
the Byzantine Emperor ordered the arrest of all the Venetians in his territory (estimated
to sum up to 20,000 over a total population beneath 100,000) and the conﬁscation of all
their goods.
Second, to keep the structure as simple as possible, the model assumes that the State
functioned as an enforcement and information-transmission mechanism. As a result the
model ignores the role of adverse selection, moral hazard with hidden eﬀort/action, incom-
plete contracting and private-order institutions in shaping contracts, although in reality
these forces might play an important role. The assumption that the legal system can en-
force contracts contingent on veriﬁable information is standard in the Finance and Contract
Theory literatures. In late-medieval Venice the State, in addition to developing legal in-
stitutions, generated the stream of rents required to induce the Venetians to keep their
aﬃliation with the city, thereby enabling merchants to commit not to ﬂee with their in-
vestors’ capital despite the limited ability of a medieval court to exercise its coercive power
over a merchant who emigrated.2 Transaction Costs Economics, as well as the Costly State-
2For a historical institutional analysis of the emergence of the Venetian State as an institution for
8Veriﬁcation literature, further assumes that the legal system can enforce contracts but at a
cost. The model described above does not consider any enforcement cost, although section
6 relaxes this unrealistic assumption.
The information structures reﬂect the changing State’s ability to verify information. In
far-oﬀ markets merchants were the only ones to know the bribes they had paid to pass
customs, the damages (if any) suﬀered by their wares while on transit or the true price
received and paid for their goods. However, in well-established markets public oﬃcials
carefully monitored commercial ventures in each and all of their phases. Thus, institutional
arrangements that enabled the Venetians to consolidate their colonial and commercial em-
pire in the East enhanced the State’s ability to verify information, leading from hidden
information to full information in the model (see Gonz´ alez de Lara, 2004a).
2.1 Contracts
We consider allocations that can be obtained by means of a contract enabling the funding of
the venture and specifying transfers from the merchant to the ﬁnancier both at the ﬁrst and
at the second date. Whereas ﬁrst-date transfers τ ∈ < are prior to the realization of the state
and, accordingly, are independent of it, second-date transfers τ(s) are contingent on the
state. A contract will result in consumption schedules for the merchant and the ﬁnancier, c1
and c2 respectively, where c1 := c1(s) = k1−k+s−[τ+τ(s)] and c2 := c2(s) = k2+[τ+τ(s)].3
Like today’s entrepreneurs, medieval merchants typically self-ﬁnanced only part of their
contract enforcement, see Gonza´ alez de Lara, 2004b.
3These consumption schedules capture the fact that the venture’s returns ﬁrst accrued to the merchant,
who need to cover the ﬁx cost k to generate the return s. Moreover, the evidence suggests that in pre-
modern Venice the merchant acquired the ownership of the venture returns and that he was the residual
claimant. Yet, ownership in the model is irrelevant because (i) this study is robust to the allocation of
property rights (it considers all levels of bargaining power subject to individual rationality) and (ii) there
is no incomplete contracting and, consequently, the allocation of control rights is unimportant. Formally,
nothing would change if the ﬁnancier, agent 2, had the right to the venture’s returns and consumption
were expressed as c1(s) = k1 + ˘ τ + ˘ τ(s) and c2(s) = k2 − k + s − ˘ τ − ˘ τ(s), with these new transfers to be
understood as a contingent salary payment to the merchant for his entrepreneurship. The optimal transfers
will still give rise to the same optimal allocation of consumption, with ˘ τ = −k − τ and ˘ τ(s) = s − τ(s).
9ventures— φk, with φ ∈ (0,1)— and raised the remaining capital— τ = −(1 − φ)k—
through debt-like sea loan and/or equity-like commenda contracts. Both the sea loan and
the commenda established repayment equal to all what was saved from misfortune on the
event of loss “at sea or from the action of hostile people.” Thus, merchants-entrepreneurs
were partially insured against the downside risk, for they were exempted from repayment
beyond the amount retrieved from a loss — τ(y) = y < k— but they did not enjoy full
insurance, which would have required a coverage payment— τ(y) < 0 instead of τ(y) =
y ≥ 0— to oﬀset the merchant’s lack of gain in the event of loss. The sea loan and the
commenda diﬀered only in the transfers they established in the case the ship arrived safe and
sound in port. Whereas the sea loan paid out a ﬁxed constant, the commenda divided the
commercial proﬁt according to a ratio agreed upon, and thus shared not only the downside
risk but also the commercial risk between the merchant and his ﬁnancier. In short, the
sea loan and the commenda established the same income-rights as today’s debt and equity
contracts. They were, however, silent about the allocation of control rights.
Deﬁnition 1 A sea loan contract (debt) establishes
−k ≤ τ < 0and τ(y) = y < τ(x) = τ(¯ x)
Deﬁnition 2 A commenda contract (equity) establishes
−k ≤ τ < 0and τ(y) = y < τ(x) < τ(¯ x)
But, if the debt-like sea loan sustained a worse risk allocation than the equity-like com-
menda (risk averse merchants bore all the commercial risk), why was it used? Standard
contract theory informs us that in a one-period model contracts can only be made con-
tingent on states whose occurrence can be veriﬁed to the satisfaction of all contracting
parties (incentive compatibility). In other words, ﬁnancial contracts in the model under
hidden information cannot depend on merchant’s private information, thereby ruling out
commenda contracts. Gonz´ alez de Lara (2004a) identiﬁes empirically various situations in
10which the State could not verify the true venture return and others in which the State
could, and ﬁnd that the sea loan and the commenda were used as predicted: the sea loan
when and where hidden information prevented the merchant from credibly committing not
to misappropriate some of the return; the better-risk sharing commenda when and where
various institutional developments alleviated this hidden information problem.
Yet, many questions should be addressed. Why were the ﬁnanciers entailed to all the
capital saved from misfortune in case of loss— τ(y) = y— or, put it diﬀerently, why
were both the entrepreneur and the ﬁnancier “protected” with limited liability? Why did
the merchants ﬁnance part of their ventures and raise additional funds through debt-like
sea loan and equity-like commenda contracts before investing 100 percent of their own
resources— φ ∈ (0,1)? Did the observed capital structure provide the optimal allocation of
risk? And why did the Venetians provided insurance through the credit market? Indeed,
later in the ﬁfteenth and sixteenth centuries, credit and insurance were furnished through
two distinct contracts. Overseas trade was then typically funded through risk-free bills of
exchange and insured through premium contracts, with the particularity that the premium
was commonly paid after the insured cargo was safely arrived to destination.4 The formal
model provides the foundations for addressing these questions.
Deﬁnition 3 A bill of exchange (risk-free debt) establishes
−k ≤ τ < 0and τ(y) = τ(x) = τ(¯ x)
Deﬁnition 4 A pure insurance contract establishes either τ > 0 with at least one τ(s) < 0
(as today’s premium insurance contracts) or τ = 0 with at least one τ(s) < 0 and other
τ(s) > 0 (as commonly happened in pre-modern Europe). In brief, a pure insurance contract
is such that, at date 1, the entrepreneur receives in some states a positive payment from his
ﬁnancier-insurer, i.e. ∃s : τ(s) < 0.
4The bill of exchange was an order to pay in one place in one kind of money because of a payment
received in a diﬀerent place in a diﬀerent kind of money. There was always a time lag between receipt and
payment, so that one of the parties was extending credit to the other in the meantime.
112.2 Optimal Contracts
A contract is optimal if and only if it sustains an optimal allocation of consumption, which
is deﬁned as the solution to the following (concave) problem for some given value of U2.5
Further, we restrict our attention to contractual forms that sustain the optimal allocations
for all individually rational levels of U2, i.e. regardless of the competitive structure of the
capital market. Thus, the model can explain the variety of ﬁnancial relations observed
in Venice, where it was as common that non-noble merchants of low means raised capital
from the leading aristocracy as that rich and politically-powerful merchants got funds from
medium-class artisans. In other words, the model— in contrast with Lacker and Weinberg
(1989), Bolton and Schartfstein (1990) and Hart and Moore (1998), where optimal contracts






s.t. E{U2[c2(s)]} ≥ U2 (2)
ci(s) ≥ 0 ∀i,∀s (3)
X
i
ci(s) ≤ w(s) ∀s. (4)
Restrictions (3)-(4) are feasibility constrains. Consumption cannot be negative and
cannot exceed total resources. Constrain (4) holds with equality, since resources are not
spared optimally. Therefore, c1(s) = w(s)−c2(s) and the problem can be solve on c2(s) for
s ∈ S. It also follows that (2) holds with equality, so that the concave utility possibilities
frontier can be traced out as the parameter U2 is varied. Individual rationality imposes
5The Revelation Principle ensures that any contingent allocation that satisﬁes the self-selection property,
i.e. which is incentive compatible, can be achieved under a mechanism (a contract). This allows us to convert
a problem of characterizing eﬃcient contracts into a simpler one of characterizing eﬃcient allocations, as
in a pure exchange economy. Then, we only have to ﬁnd a contract that sustains the optimal allocation
and respects all the restrictions.
12both a lower and upper bound on U2. Hereafter, this parameter is restricted to lie in this
interval.
The lower bound is given by the ﬁnancier’s ex-ante participation constraint
U2 ≥ U2[k2], (5)
which ensures that he is as well oﬀ under the contract as he is under autarky. The upper
bound of the parameter U2 varies depending on the merchant’s initial endowments. If he
is endowed with zero wealth, k1 = 0, U2 ≤ E{U2[k2 − k + s]} because the merchant will
always agree to undertake the venture. His ex-ante participation constraint, E{U1[c1(s)]} ≥
E{U1[k1]}, can thus be ignored, for his best alternative is consuming nothing in all the
states, which gives him no more utility than he can get through contracting, as constraint
(3) reads. If, on the contrary, the merchant is initially endowed with the necessary resources
to ﬁnance the venture himself, k1 > k, he can undertake the venture alone and consume
c1(s) = k1 − k + s. In this case, his individually rational constraint
E{U1[c1(s)]} ≥ E{U1[k1 − k + s]} (6)
is more restrictive than his ex-ante participation constraint, because of (1) for i = 1 and
utility functions exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA). This implies a smaller
upper bound on the parameter U2 for k1 > k than for k1 = 0.
Also, the restricted set over which contracts are optimally chosen changes depending
on the assumed information structure. First, incentive-compatibility restriction (8) must
be fulﬁlled when the merchant posses hidden information, but it is relaxed when the com-
mercial return is veriﬁable. Second, hidden information restricts the upper bound of the
parameter U2 to the expected value of the veriﬁable second-date endowment.
U2 ≤ py U2[k2 − k + y] + [px + p¯ x]U2[k2 − k + x] < E{U2[k2 − k + s]}. (7)
133 Optimal risk-sharing with k1 = 0 under hidden in-
formation: a debt-like sea loan contract
Let us ﬁrst examine the case in which the merchant-entrepreneur is constrained to rely on
external funds because of a shortage of his own (k1 = 0) and has hidden information about
the realization of the venture’s return. Incentive compatibility imposes ﬁxed consumption
for the ﬁnancier on the event that the ship with its cargo arrived at port safe and sound
(see Townsend, 1982):
c2(x) = c2(x) = c2(¯ x). (8)
Thus, hidden information naturally explains ﬁx repayment in debt-like sea loan con-
tracts: τ(x) = τ(x) = τ(¯ x). Yet, an explanation for the optimality of the sea loan needs
also to account for the fact that it established repayment equal to all the capital retrieved
from a navigation accident, just like today’s standard debt contract entails the ﬁnancier to
recoup as much of his credit as possible from the ﬁrm’s assets if the ﬁrm fails, τ(y) = y.





s.t. E{U2[c2(s)]} = U2 (9)
c2(y) ≤ w(y), c2(x) ≤ w(x), c2(s) ≥ 0, (10)
where U2, satisfying (5) and (7), deﬁnes each individually-rational optimal allocation
and restriction (10) combines the feasibility constraints (3) and (4) with the information
constraint (8).
3.1 Graphical analysis
Let us depict the optimal event-contingent allocations of consumption in an Edgeworth
Box, whose dimensions are given by the total resources of the economy in each state,
14w(s) = k2 − k + s. Under hidden information incentive compatibility imposes c2(x) =
c2(¯ x) = c2(x). Therefore, there are two instead of three independent variables and the
analysis can be drawn in a two dimensional picture, with a trick: the consumption of
the ﬁnancier is two event-contingent, but the consumption of the merchant is three state-
contingent. Thus, ﬁgures 1 to 4 present an Edgeworth Box in which the consumption of
the merchant has two diﬀerent origins. The presence of hidden information, and restriction
c2(x) ≤ w(x) in particular, also accounts for the shaded noncontractible area. This means
that c1(¯ x) ≥ ¯ x − x > 0 because the merchant can expropriate ex-post the non-veriﬁable
component of the proﬁt, so that contracts with τ(x) > x are non enforceable and the
maximum utility that the ﬁnancier can achieve is given by the value of U2 in (7).
From ﬁgure 1 it is clear without further analysis that risk-free debt contracts providing
constant consumption to the ﬁnancier does not satisfy the ﬁnancier’s ex-ante participation
constraint— PC2 in ﬁgure 1— as long as the venture involves risk: y < k. In other
words, risk-free loans sustaining individually-rational allocations, c2(x) = c2(y) ≥ k2, are
not feasible (they lie outside the Edgeworth Box; see, for example, point A) because the
merchant is short of resources to pay out a non-contingent transfer on the event of a loss
(i.e. τ(y) = τ(x) ≥ k is not feasible). Therefore, the mobilization of capital in long-distance
trade required the sharing of the downside risk between the merchant an his ﬁnancier. How
much insurance would the ﬁnancier optimally provide to the merchant?
3.2 Risk preferences
Let imagine for a moment a large number of independent and identically distributed ven-
tures and merchants. If long-distance trade had been so characterized, the ﬁnancier could
have diversiﬁed the idiosyncratic risks faced by each poor merchant (k1 = 0). Therefore,
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16it would have been optimal for the ﬁnancier to provide full downside insurance— with
τ(y) < 0 ≤ y— to each merchant, whose consumption would have thus been smoothed.6
In other words, on the margin the ﬁnancier would have behaved as if he were risk neutral
(each merchant being risk averse) and the sea loan— with τ(y) = y— would have provided
too little insurance to the merchant. Figure 2 shows that, under these risk preferences,
the sea loan would have never been optimal, since any eﬃcient and individually rational
allocation would have been then characterized by c2(y) < w(y), which implies τ(y) < y.
Alternatively, if the merchant had been risk-neutral and the ﬁnancier risk-averse, the sea
loan— which provides as little insurance to the merchant as feasibility constraints impose—
would have been optimal (see ﬁgure 3) and it would have also been so if both agents had
been risk-neutral, since then any division of risk would have been optimal.
Let us now consider the most realistic case in which both the merchant and his ﬁnancier
are risk averse. Figure 4 illustrates diﬀerent possible contract curves: CC0 and CC. For
parameter values leading to CC0, debt-like sea loans are not optimal. To sustain any
allocation in the core,7 the ﬁnancier would need to provide more downside insurance than
the merchant enjoys through a sea loan contract: c2(y) < w(y) = k2−k+y. On the contrary,
the sea loan is optimal for parameter values leading to a contract curve like CC in ﬁgure 1
and 4. The contract curve CC is such that at the corner point (c2(y),c2(x)), with c2(y) =
k2 −k +y and c2(x) ≥ k2 −k +tpc, the slope of the merchant’s indiﬀerence curve is smaller
6Yet, merchants would have borne the commercial risk, because of hidden information. Therefore, the
merchant’s consumption would have not been constant across states: c1(x) = w(x)−c2(x) < w(x)−c2(x) =
c1(x) = c1(y) = w(y) − c2(y) < w(¯ x) − c2(x) = c1(¯ x). The ﬁrst and the last equalities derive from
the incentive-compatibility constraint (8) and the inequalities from w(y) < w(x) < w(x) < w(¯ x), with
w(x) and c1(x) deﬁned such that
p¯ x
px+p¯ x U0
1[w(¯ x) − c2(x)] +
px
px+p¯ xU0
1[w(x) − c2(x)] = U0
1[w(x) − c2(x)] and
c1(x) = w(x) − c2(x). Then, the ﬁrst order conditions for a risk neutral ﬁnancier can be expressed as
U0
1[w(x) − c2(x)] = U0
1[w(y) − c2(y)]. This implies an optimal allocation such that c1(x) = c1(y).
7The core in this simple two-agent economy is standardly deﬁned as the Pareto eﬃcient individually-
rational event-contingent consumption allocations. It is represented as the Pareto set that lies between the
indiﬀerence curves that pass through the initial endowments, meaning the shaded interval of the Contract
Curve CC or CC0 in ﬁgures 1 to 4.
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20than the slope of the ﬁnancier’s indiﬀerence curve, meaning that, to renounce to a marginal
unit of state-y-consumption, the ﬁnancier wants more units of event-x-consumption than
the merchant values that extra marginal unit of state-y-consumption. A corner sea loan
contract, establishing τ = −k, τ(y) = y, and τ(x) = τ(¯ x) = ˜ t, will then sustain the unique
optimal allocation of risk, with ˜ t ∈ [tpc,x] taking diﬀerent values for each individually-
rational level of bargaining power U2. In sum, because of the merchant’s lack of resources,
k1 = 0, the ﬁnancier needs to fund the venture on its entirety (φ = 0 so that τ = −k)
and bears at least the downside risk of losing the capital he contributes minus the amount
saved from failure “at sea or from the action of the enemy” (feasibility constraints impose
τ(y) ≤ y). Under parameter values leading to CC, this transfer is optimally set at its
bound, τ(y) = y, whereas for parameter values leading to CC0, it optimally takes smaller
values, τ(y) < y. The point is that contracting through debt-like sea loan contracts—
with τ(y) = y— is not unambiguously eﬃcient under two-side risk aversion. Under what
conditions/parmeter values, if any, is the sea loan optimal?
3.3 Comparative Statics
A simple exercise in comparative statics leads to proposition 1, whose rationale is explained
below and proved in appendix A.
Proposition 1 The more risky and costly the venture is (the higher py and the lower y,
the higher k relative to k2, and the lower E[x] = px x + p¯ x ¯ x given x ≥ tpc), the more
likely it is that the risk averse merchant raises funds from the risk averse ﬁnancier through
a debt-like sea loan contract, optimally.
On the likely event of a navigation incident (py high), the ﬁnancier could not recoup any
amount beyond what was saved from misfortune, which was dreadfully insuﬃcient (y very
low) to reward the capital investment: τ(y) ≤ y  k. This implied a very signiﬁcant loss
to the ﬁnancier, for he invested a major part of his scarce initial endowment in the venture
21(k high relative to k2). To compensate for the possibility of loss, the ﬁnancier required
soaring payments when the merchandise arrived at port safe and sound. This payment ˜ t
was very high relative to the expected value of the commercial return (E[x] = px x + p¯ x ¯ x
low, implying a low p =
p¯ x
px+p¯ x, x, and/or ¯ x). Indeed, sea loan contracts usually charged
yearly interest rates above 33 percent for relatively safe ventures. For particularly risky
voyages, interest rates rose up to well above 40 percent, not yearly but for the few months
a voyage lasted (Gonz´ alez de Lara, 2004a).8
As a result, voluntary ﬁnancial contracting (for any level of bargaining power subject to
the ﬁnancier’s ex-ante participation constraint) calls for commercial transfers τ(x) = t ≥
˜ t ≥ tpc such that the merchant consumes very little in all the states: 0 ≤ y−τ(y) = c1(y) <
E[c1(x)] = E[x] − t ≤ E[x] − ˜ t ≤ E[x] − tpc, with t decreasing as τ(y) ≤ y approximates
y (the ﬁnancier’s indiﬀerence curves, and PC2 in particular, have negative slope). On the
contrary, the ﬁnancier’s event-consumption varies widely: c2(y) = k2−k+τ(y) ≤ k2−k+y
is very low while c2(x) = k2 − k + t ≥ k2 − k + ˜ t ≥ k2 − k + tpc is very high. Thus,
along the relevant indiﬀerence curve in the Edgeworth Box (to the North-East of PC2), the
merchant’s consumption is smoother than the ﬁnancier’s consumption
max{E[c1(x)] − c1(y)} = E[x] − ˜ t  ˜ t − y = min{c2(x) − c2(y)}, (11)
where the volatility of agents’ consumption is the least by setting τ(y) = y and τ(x) = ˜ t,
with ˜ t ∈ [tpc,x] depending on each party’s bargaining power. Consequently, the risk averse
ﬁnancier values consumption in the case of failure relatively more than the merchant and
it is optimal that the merchant provides as much downside-risk insurance to the ﬁnancier
as possible, ˜ τ(y) = y. So, the sea loan is optimal in proposition 1.
8Likewise, commenda contracts—which provided exactly the same downside insurance than the sea loan,
τ(y) = y— customarily remunerate capital with three fourths of the commercial proﬁt.
22Inequality (11) is thus a necessary and suﬃcient condition under two-side risk aversion
for the optimality of the sea loan (debt contract). The sea loan will more likely be optimal
the lower E[x], the higher ˜ t ≥ tpc, and the lower y, i.e. the more risky and costly the venture
is. First, the higher py and the lower y, the higher the transfer ˜ t ∈ [tpc,x] required to
compensate for the possibility of losing the capital advanced, by construction. Second, the
more costly the venture (the lower k2−k), the more absolute risk averse the ﬁnancier is and
the higher the transfer ˜ t ≥ tpc he would require to compensate for the risk of loss— because
of DARA, the ﬁnancier’s indiﬀerence curves become more sloppy. Third, a decrease in y and
E[x] reduces the dimensions of the Edgeworth Box and shifts the merchant’s indiﬀerence
curves towards its ﬂatter region (the origin of the merchant’s consumption shifts to the
south or to the west for smaller values of the parameters y and E[x], respectively). It is
worth noting, however, that E[x] cannot take extremely low values because the minimum
veriﬁable return x needs to be high enough to compensate the ﬁnancier for the possibility
of losing his capital. In other words, the ﬁnancier would refuse funding a venture on which
he took the risk of loss, τ(y) = y < k, unless x ≥ τ(x) = ˜ t ≥ tpc.
3.4 Empirical evaluation of the theoretical predictions
This theoretical explanation for the use of the debt-like sea loan (and the equity-like com-
menda, see next section) lends itself to empirical evaluation. First, as predicted, sea loan
(and commenda) contracts, with repayment equal to all the capital saved from loss at sea
or from the action of hostile people and very high repayment otherwise, prevailed during
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when trading ventures were indeed highly risky and
costly.
Second, the sea loan (and the commenda) lost their popularity when “commerce lost
much of its adventurous and almost heroic features” (py lower and y higher) and “tended to
23become a routine” (E[x] = px x + p¯ x ¯ x higher),9 and wealth accumulation from commerce
reduced the former scarcity of capital (k2 higher, at least with respect to k).10 Consistent
with the model’s predictions, the Venetians responded to this environmental change— the
new parameter values violated (11), leading to a contract curve such as CC0 in ﬁgure 4— by
developing new contractual forms such that the merchants enjoyed more insurance against
the downside risk than they used to receive through sea loan and commenda contracts:
ˆ c2(y) < w2(y). From late in the fourteenth century, sea ventures were typically funded
through risk-free bills of exchange, with ˆ τ(y) = ˆ τ(x) = ˆ τ(¯ x), and insured through premium
policies, with ˆ τ(y) < −k + y < 0.
Finally, the severe drop on insurance rates lends empirical support to the theoretical
explanation for the selection of alternative contracts. The model predicts the use of the sea
loan (and the commenda) because the high risk and cost initially involved in sea ventures
made insurance too expensive, thereby leading the merchant to buy as little insurance as
he could, τ(y) = y ≥ 0. Likewise, the model predicts the use of premium insurance, with
τ(y) < 0, in response to a fall in the insurance cost. In real truth, underwriters during the
ﬁfteenth century charged much lower premiums than their counterparts from the twelfth
and thirteenth centuries used to obtained through sea loan and commenda contracts. The
insurance rates varied widely according to the type of vessel, the port of call, the state
of war or peace, the season of the year, and other circumstances, but insurance policies
remained consistently cheaper than the insurance rates paid above the safe interest on sea
loans. As already mentioned, rates of return on sea loans, repayable upon safe arrival of
9The quotations are from the great historian of the Commercial Revolution Lopez (1976, p. 97), who also
noted that “high risks and high proﬁts were predominant in the early stages of the Commercial Revolution;
they were instrumental in forming the ﬁrst accumulations of capital.”
10That capital became relatively less scarce is indicated by the sharp drop in interest rates. During the
twelfth century Venice’s “common use of our land” established a 20 percent yearly interest on risk-free
loans, subjected to double penalty if payment was delayed and secured by a general lien on the debtor’s
property (Gonz´ alez de Lara, 2004a). By the mid fourteenth century average interest rates on commercial
loans within Venice had declined to 5 percent (Luzzatto, 1943, pp. 76-79) and the 1482’s new issue of
government bonds promised to pay 5 percent yearly interest on perpetuity (Mueller, 1997, p. 420).
24the ship, varied from 25 to 50 percent for the duration of the voyage, while yearly interest
rates on risk-free loans— although high— only amounted to 20 percent, thereby implying
an insurance cost from around 15 to 40 percent on sea loans. The premium paid during
the ﬁfteenth century for the safest voyages amounted to a mere 1-1,5 percent and raised
up to 20 percent for exceptionally risky ventures (see, for example, De Roover, 1945, and
Tenenti, 1991).
4 Optimal risk-sharing with k1 = 0 under full informa-
tion: an equity-like commenda contract
The previous section shows that, when ventures are highly risky and costly, the sea loan
emerges optimally under hidden information. However, the (risk-averse) merchant unde-
sirably undertakes all the commercial risk, τ(x) = τ(¯ x) because of his inability to commit
to reveal a commercial return other than the minimum veriﬁable (x by assumption). The
provision of veriﬁable information relaxes incentive-compatibility constraints and enables
better risk-sharing commenda contracts, with τ(y) < τ(x) < τ(¯ x). Yet, to explain the
optimality of the commenda, one need to account for the fact that it shares the downside
risk in the very same manner as the sea loan, with τ(y) = y.
With a sea loan, the ﬁnancier bears as little downside risk as possible, τ(y) = y, while
taking none of the commercial risk, τ(x) = τ(¯ x). If this is the eﬃcient agreement under
hidden information, it naturally follows that the ﬁnancier will not optimally bear more
downside risk once he is optimally assuming part of the commercial risk, τ(x) < τ(¯ x) under
full information. Thus the optimality of the commenda derives from that of the sea loan
and can hence be linked to the venture’s risk and cost characteristics. Proposition 2, which
is proven in Appendix B, follows.
25Proposition 2 If the sea loan sustains all the optimal individually-rational allocations un-
der hidden information, the commenda supports the corresponding allocations under full
information.
4.1 Empirical evaluation of the theoretical predictions
In the model, debt-like sea loan and equity-like commenda contracts can coexist under
various information structures, which is in sharp contrast with the costly state veriﬁca-
tion/falsiﬁcation literature. In reality, the sea loan and the commenda were simultaneously
used to ﬁnance diﬀerent kinds of sea ventures. For example, from the thirteen documented
ventures taken in 1190, when Venice had not yet consolidated her commercial empire in
the East, eight were funded through sea loans but the ﬁve round voyages from Venice to
her well-established colonies in Constantinople and the Adriatic Sea were funded through
commenda contracts. Moreover, various ﬁnanciers who invested through the sea loan later
used the commenda and some of those who relied on the commenda had previously used
the sea loan (see Gonz´ alez de Lara, 2004b , for more details).
In fact, the commenda substituted the sea loan as the predominant way of funding
sea ventures by the turn of the twelfth century. This observation can be accounted for as
reﬂecting changes in the State’s ability to verify information. Gonz´ alez de Lara (2004a)
documents various institutional developments— such as the ediﬁcation of a commercial
empire in the Levant, the public organization of round convoys from Venice to her colonies,
and the implementation of very detailed regulations and State’s direct controls over trade—
that enhanced the State’s ability to adjudicate disputes and punish cheaters. The resulting
enhanced State’s ability to verify information, however, did not crystallized all at once, but
it rather developed incrementally as overseas trade became well-established throughout the
various Venetian colonies in the Levant, and as trading voyages were organized in State’s
round convoys from Venice to the Venetian enclaves in the East. As a result, the commenda
26contract progressively acquired prominence as the twelfth century turned to its close and
prevailed by the third decade of the thirteenth century, when Venice had consolidated her
commercial and colonial Empire in the East.
The observed transition from the sea loan to the commenda in response to changes in the
State’s ability to verify information lends empirical support to the theoretical assumption
that the State provided contract enforcement under two distinct information structures.
5 Risk-sharing through Credit Contracts, k1 > k
The previous two sections show that when the merchant must rely on external funds for all
the venture’s capital requirements because of a shortage of his owns (k1 = 0), the sea loan
or the commenda— one or the other depending on the information structure— are corner
solutions. Not only is the ﬁnancier consuming all the second-date endowment in the case
of loss, ˜ c2(y) = w(y), but both parties would have been better oﬀ if more resources had
been allocated to his consumption in this state. This implies that a contract with higher
repayment in case of navigation loss— which provides less downside insurance to the mer-
chant than the sea loan and the commenda— would have been Pareto improving. However,
such contract is not feasible because the merchant is already paying with everything he has,
meaning the very low or zero proceeds of the venture, τ(y) = y. Limited liability is thus
understood in terms of optimal risk-sharing when feasibility constraints are binding.
When the merchant is initially endowed with more resources, k1 > k > 0, the total
downside endowment w(y) = k1 + k2 − k + y gets larger and the constraint c2(y) ≤ w(y)
cease to be binding in the optimum. An interior optimal allocation (c∗
2(y),c∗
2(x)) can then
be achieved, with c∗
2(y) > ˜ c2(x) = w(y) = k2 − k + y and c∗
2(x) < ˜ c2(x). Therefore,
individually-rational optimal allocations with k1 > k > 0 will no longer entail raising funds
27for the whole trading venture (τ∗ 6= −k) through sea loan or commenda contracts. Yet,
these allocations (c∗
2(y),c∗
2(x)) can still be achieved through a sea loan or a commenda
providing only part of the capital requirements. The merchant ﬁnances part of the venture
himself and bears its corresponding downside risk, thus eﬀectively receiving less downside
insurance. In particular, proposition 3 holds.
Proposition 3 The optimal event-contingent allocation of consumption when k1 > k can
be attained by self-ﬁnancing part of the venture φ∗ ∈ (0,1) and raising external funds
through a debt-like sea loan or an equity-like commenda, one or the other depending on the
information structure, for the rest of the capital requirements, τ∗ = −(1 − φ∗)k > −k.
5.1 Graphical analysis
When the merchant is initially endowed with k1 > k > 0, there are more resources in the
economy than when he does not have any initial wealth, k1 = 0, so that the corresponding
Edgeworth Box is larger. Figure 5 represents both the Edgeworth Boxes for parameters
λk1=0 (with k1 = 0) and λk1>k (with k1 > k > 0), although for ease of exposition the
noncontractible area is not depicted under the hidden information scenario.11
Because of DARA, the indiﬀerence curves of the merchant become ﬂatter as he receives
more initial wealth, while those of the ﬁnancier are unaltered by any increase of the mer-
chant’s wealth. Therefore, the contract curve for interior points for parameters λk1>k lies
below the contract curve for λk1=0. The previous subsections shows that the contract curve
for k1 = 0 can be represented by CCλk1=0 in ﬁgure 5 when a venture is risky and costly and
both agents are risk-averse. Therefore, the contract curve for k1 > k will be characterized
by CCλk1>k in ﬁgure 5.
11Alternatively, ﬁgure 5 can be thought of as representing a face of the Edgeworth Boxes for a given value
of c2(¯ x) under full information. In this case there are three events for both agents and the contract curve
must be represented in a 3-dimensional Edgeworth Box. However, as we are looking at a binding restriction
for only one event, we can abstract from the optimal relationship between c2(¯ x) and c2(x) given by the
Kuhn-Tucker conditions of program 3 (in the appendix) and draw the optimal allocation in an intuitive
2-dimensional Edgeworth Box with coordinates ci(y),ci(x).
28FIGURE 5
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Q QHHEx-ante PC2 ≡
Individual Rationality
29The individually-rational allocations, in addition to belonging to the contract curve,
must satisfy the individually-rational participation constraints, which, as noted before, are
more restrictive than the ex-ante participation constraint for the merchant. The merchants’
individually rational constraint (6) takes into account the technological and ﬁnancial ability
of the merchant to undertake the project alone. Therefore, any individually rational alloca-
tion must provide him with at least the same utility he would get by ﬁnancing the venture
himself and taking all its proﬁts and risks. Yet, the merchant will voluntarily exchange
with the ﬁnancier because ﬁnancial contracting leads to mutually beneﬁcial risk-sharing.
The core of this simple economy will be thus characterized by the interval [BP1,BP2]
on the contract curve, where the point BPi is the individually-rational optimal allocation
when agent i has all the bargaining power (see ﬁgure 5). In other words, the lower bound
of the interval to which U2 belongs remains U2(k2) but its upper bound is now given
by the merchants’ individually-rational constraint (6). When the ﬁnancier has all the
bargaining power, the optimal event-consumption allocation BP2 lies on the indiﬀerence
curve of the merchant providing him with his minimum individually rational expected utility
E{U1[k1−k+s]} (see point A and BP2 in ﬁgure 5). By construction of the contract curve,
this merchant’s indiﬀerence curve intersects at BP2 with the ﬁnancier’s indiﬀerence curve
assigning him the individually-rational maximum value of U2.
From inspection of ﬁgure 5, it follows that the optimal allocation BP1 reached when
the merchant exercises all the bargaining poweris such that that c∗
2(y) > k2 − k + y (see
appendix C). Also, the optimal allocation BP2 reached when the ﬁnancier exercises all the
bargaining power is such that c∗
2(y) < k2. Thus, any allocation in the core satisﬁes lemma
1, which is proved in appendix C.
Lemma 1 k2 − k + y < c∗
2(y) = k2 − (1 − φ∗)k + τ∗(y) < k2
30In sum, the optimal allocation of risk can be attained by letting the merchant provide
a part φ∗ ∈ (0,1) of the capital requirements and raise additional funds (τ = −(1 − φ∗)k)
through a sea loan (under hidden information) or a commenda (under full information)
with τ∗(y) = y.
This result is novel in the optimal security design literature based on agency costs
(both in the costly state-veriﬁcation and the incomplete contracting ones) which predicts
an extreme inside participation rate: either the (risk-neutral) merchant-manager does not
resort to outside funding until he has invested 100 percent of his personal wealth (φ = 1)
or he (being risk-averse) does not ﬁnance the project at all (φ = 0). However, we observe
in reality that the merchants invested part of their wealth in their businesses and raised
additional funds in the form of sea loan and commenda contracts. In this simple model,
debt-like sea loan and equity-like commenda contracts optimally exhibit limited liability
because of risk-sharing even when ﬁnancial constraints are not binding (k1 > k).
6 Enforcement Costs
The optimal allocation of risk c∗
2(y) ∈ (k2 − k + y,k2), though, can be attained through a
multiplicity of contracts, for example through a combination of riskless debt— with τ = −k
and τ(y) = τ(x) = τ(¯ x) ≥ k— and premium insurance— with τ > 0, −τ(y) < k − y and
τ(x) = τ(¯ x) = 0.12 When the merchant is initially endowed with zero capital (k1 = 0), a
risk-free debt contract is not enforceable (feasible) unless associated with insurance, which
might explain the observed provision of credit and insurance within the same contract during
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. However, even when merchants were endowed with
the resources required to ﬁnance the venture on their own, they relied on external funds and
12The possibility to make transfers both at date 0 and 1 creates a nominal indeterminacy, as in Bolton-
Bolton and Schartfstein [1990] and Hart and Moore [1998]. What matters is no so much the particular
security structure but the linear space it involves. Any linear combination of various points in the Edge-
worth box that span the optimal event consumption allocation can be thought of as optimal contracts.
31used sea loan and commenda contracts, with τ(y) = y, as both credit and insurance devices.
It was only from late in the fourteenth century that insurance began slowly to develop as
an independent form of business, when— as section 3 suggets— overseas trade became
relatively less risky and costly and, accordingly, the optimal allocation of the downside
risk could no longer be achieved through the sea loan or the commenda. Thus, one needs
to understand why the sea loan and the commenda prevailed during the twelfth and the
thirteenth centuries, respectively, despite the possibility of using other contracts to achieve
the very same optimal allocation of risk.
One possible explanation focuses on the transaction costs of thinking, negotiating and
writing new contracts, and thus on the additional administrative and/or regulating costs of
enforcing these new contract. Moreover, since debt-like sea loan and equity-like commenda
contracts are necessary to attain the optimal allocation of risk when the merchant lacks
suﬃcient resources to ﬁnance the venture himself, the theory of standardization (see Allen
and Gale, 1994) predicts the use of these very same contracts even when the merchant is
endowed with the required resources.
In the light of the incomplete contracting literature (see Hart, 1995) one would expect,
as observed, that optimal contracts ensure that, whatever happens, each side has some pro-
tection against opportunistic behavior by the other party. Because both the merchant and
his potential ﬁnancier-insurer can default on their promised future payments, the optimal
contract will minimize those payments, while guaranteeing the optimal allocation of risk.
This is achieved by making both parties commit part of their wealth to the funding of the
venture, φ∗ ∈ (0,1), and ﬁnancing the rest through sea loan and commenda contracts. In
this respect, it is meaningful that insurance premiums were agreed to be paid after the con-
clusion of the voyage. Not only could the merchant pay the premiums from the venture’s
proceeds, but he also received some “power” against the possibility that the underwriters
32defaulted on the coverage payments. However, as the insured not seldom delayed paying the
premiums due on their policies long after their ships were safely returned, so the insurers
were dilatory about payment in case of loss (Tenenti, 1991, p.675).
Furthermore, one can reasonable argue that enforcing payments from the parties’ initial
wealth, k1 and k2, if any, was much more arduous than from the venture’s returns, for
example, because the underwriter might have actually failed in the intervening time from
the signing of the insurance contract to the payment of the coverage or because the absence
of an eﬀective registration system enabled defaulters to hide their real property, particularly
if abroad. In Venice as elsewhere, marine insurance remained in the hands of private
underwriters, operating alone or with partners but with very limited capital, until the end
of the eighteenth century. They were commonly involved in all kind of trades and it was all
but rare that they were unable or unwilling to meet the coverage payments, as indicated
by the rulings of the Venetian magistracy on insurance, who found that “there was no
money that more gladly is touched and more diﬃcultly is paid than that of the maritime
insurance” (Tenenti, 1991, p. 677; see also De Roover, 1945, p. 197).
Since merchants could not use collateral to fulﬁll their obligations without incurring in
a high enforcement cost, risk-free debt and more generally any contract with τ(y) > y ≥ 0
was hardly used. Similarly, because it was costly to identify and conﬁscate agents’ future
wealth at date 1, pure insurance contracts with τ(y) < 0 did not develop until the changing
character of long-distance trade made them the only means through which the optimal
allocation of risk could be achieved. In sum,the model predicts uniqueness in the optimal use
of the sea loan and the commenda (one or the other depending on the information structure)
under the realistic assumption that the (minimum) venture’s returns are contractible at a
lower cost than the agents’s initial wealth.
337 Conclusions
This paper combines a mechanism-design model and historical evidence to examine the
ﬁnancial structure in pre-modern long-distance trade. Merchants-entrepreneurs raised funds
both internally, through (inside) equity holdings, and externally, through debt-like sea loan
and equity-like commenda contracts. This capital structure can be rationalized as being
determined to achieve the optimal allocation of risk while minimizing enforcement costs.
The extent to which these factors are relevant today is indicated by the generality of the
model’s assumptions and results.
First, two-side risk aversion. Historically, signiﬁcant indivisibilities and aggregate risk
limited the agents’ ability to diversify, preventing them from eﬀectively becoming risk neu-
tral. Today, most companies have a large share-holder who is not well-diversiﬁed (Zingales,
2000, p. 1628). Risk-aversion, because of limited risk-pooling, is typically assumed when
dealing with the myriad of young and small ﬁrms who do not have access to public mar-
kets, such as individual proprietorships, partnerships and closely-held corporations. Even
when the ﬁnancial capital is held by well-diversiﬁed investors, large widely-held corpora-
tions might still act in a risk-averse manner because the human capital invested in the ﬁrm
is not well-diversiﬁed (Zingales, 2000); the ﬁrm’s managers faces some kind of bankruptcy
costs (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1990); managerial compensation is aligned with sharehold-
ers wealth maximization (Smith and Stulz, 1985); or there exist proprietary information
(De Marzo and Duﬃe, 1991). Furthermore, although various works on Transaction Costs
Economics have recently criticized risk-sharing arguments on account of their lack of em-
pirical signiﬁcance (mainly for labor contracts), Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) shows that,
controlling for endogenous matching, risk aversion appears to inﬂuence contract choice.
Assuming more tractably risk neutrality would be innocuous had the optimal capital
34structure been robust to risk preferences. However, the entrepreneurs’ partial funding of the
project (a non-extreme inside participation rate) can hardly be explained unless considering
managerial risk aversion. Further, the paper’s simple model also shows that neither debt
nor equity— with repayment equal to all the capital saved from the project in the case
of failure— would be optimal if (on the margin risk-neutral) ﬁnanciers could diversify the
idiosyncratic risks faced by each (risk-averse) merchant; rather, optimal risk-sharing would
require that the ﬁnancier provide full insurance to the merchant against the downside risk,
say through a ﬁx salary. Current capital structure’s theories can therefore be enriched by
taking into account optimal risk-sharing, as already suggested by both Townsend (1978)
and Gale and Hellwig (1981), who, in their theory of debt based on costly state veriﬁcation,
recognized that standard debt contracts are not eﬃcient if the parties are risk averse.
Second, limited contract enforceability. Historically, enforcing payments from the agents’
private wealth was more costly than from the venture’s returns since, on the one hand, nei-
ther eﬀective registration systems nor joint-stock insurance companies had yet developed
and, on the other hand, the State fairly controlled sea ventures. Today, enforcement costs
arguably cause banks’ reluctance to go through bankruptcy procedures for recovering loans
from the debtors’ personal wealth (collateral). Similarly, an insurance company runs ad-
ministrative cost greater than those of a capital market where bonds and equity are traded.
It can therefore be reasonably argued that credit and insurance are optimally provided
through the capital structure, rather than separately through risk-free debt from a bank
and premium policies from an insurance company, because of enforcement costs. Thus, the
model complements the optimal portfolio selection theory, which explains the holding of
equity by both entrepreneurs and outsiders in terms of managerial risk aversion but ignores
other contracts through which an outsider can potentially provide the same risk allocation.
Furthermore, limited contract enforceability can inform more complex capital structure’s
35theories, like the incomplete contracting models of Bolton and Schartfstein (1990) and Hart
and Moore (1998), where debt emerges as one of many optimal contracts. In our simple
model, uniqueness is achieved by imposing reasonable assumptions on enforcement costs.
In other words, the irrelevance theorem of Modigliani and Miller does not apply because of
enforcement constraints.
Third, although the model is tailored for the historical example, it can also be interpreted
as representing today’s ﬁnancial relations between an entrepreneur and a potential investor-
insurer. The entrepreneur can undertake a risky investment project with a ﬁx cost, k, and
a random return, s = {y,x,x}. The project is risky in the sense that, with some positive
probability, it loses money, y < k, although it has a positive expected net present value,
k < E[s]. The event of loss, s = y, can be reasonably assumed to be observable and
veriﬁable, while the proﬁtability of a well-functioning ﬁrm, s = {x,x}, might or might
not be veriﬁable— thereby enabling or ruling out equity contracts— depending on the
availability of eﬀective disclosure mechanisms, auditing, informative economic press, and
so on and so forth. Also, failure can be identiﬁed with a natural catastrophe or a political
breakdown and the sea loan, with a catastrophe bond.
Finally, the model delivers debt and (outside) equity as corner solutions to the optimal
contracting problem when, in addition to assuming two-side risk aversion and considering
the case in which the merchant must rely on external funds because of budget constraints,
investment projects are costly and risky. Debt and equity are corner contracts in the sense
that, if feasible, both parties would prefer that the risk-averse investor recouped part of his
capital investment if the project failed, for limited liability associated with debt and equity
results in very high ﬁnancing costs. To avoid these cost, rich merchants optimally ﬁnance
part of their ventures while relying on debt and equity, one or the other depending on the
information structure. However, if the venture is relatively less risky and costly, insurance
36against the downside risk becomes relatively cheaper and entrepreneurs optimally respond
by buying more insurance through premium policies, even if at a higher enforcement costs.
Consistent with this explanation for the selection of alternative contracts, we observe
that debt-like sea loan and equity-like commenda contracts actually gave way to premium
insurance when commerce lost many of its adventurous features and wealth accumulation
from commerce reduced the former scarcity of capital. During the fourteenth and ﬁfteenth
centuries, sea ventures were commonly funded through risk-free bills of exchange, insured
through premium contracts, and organized by means of commission agents that resided
permanently abroad. Empirical conﬁrmation of these theoretical predictions lends support
to the view that risk-sharing and enforcement costs are indeed relevant in determining
ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial structure.
Yet, the model ignores other important forces shaping contracts. In particular, the
choice between debt and (outside) equity, which have motivated most research on corporate
ﬁnance, is determined by the simplest information structures: under hidden information
regarding the project’s proﬁtability, equity is not incentive-compatible and ﬁx-repayment
debt contracts arise as a second-best; under full information, however, better risk-sharing
commenda contracts become possible. The model can thus be extended to incorporate var-
ious types of agency costs, multiple margins for moral hazard, adverse selection, signaling,
transactions costs, and/or incomplete contracting.
A Proof of proposition 1
Let parameter values ˆ λ = (ˆ θ, ˆ k1,ˆ k, ˆ y, ˆ py, ˆ x, ˆ ¯ x,
ˆ p¯ x
ˆ px+ˆ p¯ x) with ˆ θ = 0 and ˆ k1 = 0 be such that
the sea loan contract does not sustain program 2’s optimal allocation of consumption,
(ˆ c2(y),ˆ c2(x)). Then, ˆ c2(y) < ˆ w(y), as draw in ﬁgure 2 for CC0, and necessary and suﬃcient
37Kuhn-Tucker conditions lead to
∂£(η,µy,µx,c2(y),c2(x);λ)
∂η = −U2 + E [U2[c2(s)]] = 0
∂£(η,µy,µx,c2(y),c2(x);λ)
∂c2(y) = −pyU0
1[w(y) − c2(y)] + η pyU0





1[w(x) − c2(x)] + p¯ xU0
1[w(¯ x) − c2(x)]

+η(1 − py)U0
2[c2(x)] − µx = 0
(12)
evaluated at ˆ η, ˆ µ(y) = ˆ µ(x) = 0, ˆ c2(y), ˆ c2(x), and ˆ λ, where η, µy, and µx are the
Lagrangian multipliers associated with restrictions (9) and (10), respectively, and £(.) is
the Lagrange function associated with Program 2.13
Let λ varies in an open neighborhood of ˆ λ such that the pattern of binding and slack
constraints of program 2 does not change. Totally diﬀerentiating (12) and applying the
Implicit Function Theorem, one can calculate the comparative statics eﬀects of each pa-
rameter value λi on c2(y) at a solution point (ˆ c2(y),ˆ c2(x)) and parameter values ˆ λ with




































































It is proved below that at a solution point (ˆ c2(y),ˆ c2(x)),
dc2(y)
d(k2−k) > 0 but dc2(y) < dw(y) = d(k2 − k)
dc2(y)
dy > 0 but dc2(y) < dw(y) = dy
dc2(y)









< 0 and dw(y) = 0.
(13)
Therefore, beginning with parameter values ˆ λ for which the sea loan contract is not op-
timal (ˆ c2(y) < ˆ w(y)), a change in parameters such that the venture becomes more costly—
13This assumes that for parameter values ˆ λ the solution of program 2 is such that ˆ c2(x) < ˆ w(x). The
case for which ˆ c2(x) = ˆ w(x) can be easily derived by adding restriction
∂£(η,µy,µx,c2(y),c2(x);λ)
∂µx = 0 to (12).
38d(k2 −k) < 0— and/or risky— dy < 0, dpy > 0 and/or dE[x] < 0— leads the new solution
to get closer and closer to the border c2(y) = w(y). At a point, the solution will reach the
border and the sea loan will be optimal.
However, this tricky point with c2(y) = w(y) and µy = 0 is on the boundary between
two regions with diﬀerent patterns of binding and slack constraints. As a result, deviations
to the left side will have to be treated using the set of equations (12) with µy = µx = 0 and
dµy = dµx = 0 while totally diﬀerentiating, whereas those to the right side using a diﬀerent
set: equation
∂£(η,µy,µx,c2(y),c2(x);λ)
∂µy = w(y) − c2(y) = 0 must be added to (12), which now
hold for µy ≥ 0 = µx and dµy 6= 0 = dµx. If parameter values keep on changing so that
the venture becomes even more risky and costly, the sea loan will keep on being optimal,
because at a solution point (˜ c2(y),˜ c2(x)) with ˜ c2(y) = ˜ w(y), and parameter values ˜ λ with






















































































  > 0— and
dc2(y)
d(k2−k) > 0 but dc2(y) = dw(y) = d(k2 − k)
dc2(y)











= 0 and dw(y) = 0.
(14)
It is worth noting that for parameters values such that µy > 0, the comparative statics
eﬀects given by (14) holds for both parameters’s increases and decreases. Therefore, the
sea loan contract is optimal for a robust set of parameters: let parameter values ˜ λ be such
that the sea loan is optimal, with ˜ c2(y) = ˜ w(y), then for parameter values in an open






































= − [py U0
2[c2(y)]]
2 h33 − [(1 − py)U0
2[c2(x)]]
2 h22 > 0
because both h22 and h33 are negative.
h22 = py U
00
1[w(y) − c2(y)] + η py U
00
2[c2(y)] =
= −py R1[w(y) − c2(y)]U
0
1[w(y) − c2(y)] − η py R2[c2(y)]U
0
2[c2(y)] =
= −py R1[w(y) − c2(y)]U
0
1[w(y) − c2(y)] − py R2[c2(y)]U
0
1[w(y) − c2(y)] =
= −py [R1[w(y) − c2(y)] + R2[c2(y)]] U
0
1[w(y) − c2(y)] < 0 (15)
and
h33 = px U
00
1[w(x) − c2(x)] + p¯ x U
00
1[w(¯ x) − c2(x)] + η (1 − py)U
00
2[c2(x)] =
= −R1[w(x) − c2(x)]U
0
1[w(x) − c2(x)] − η (1 − py)R2[c2(x)]U
0
2[c2(x)] =
= −R1[w(x) − c2(x)]U
0
1[w(x) − c2(x)] − R2[c2(x)]U
0
1[w(x) − c2(x)] =
= − [R1[w(x) − c2(x)] + R2[c2(x)]] U
0
1[w(x) − c2(x)] < 0, (16)
where the ﬁrst equalities are simply the deﬁnitions of h22 and h33; the second equalities











1[w(x) − c2(x)] + p¯ x U00
1[w(¯ x) − c2(x)]
px U0
1[w(x) − c2(x)] + p¯ x U0
1[w(¯ x) − c2(x)]
(17)
to make the notation more compact; the third equalities follow from, respectively, the
second and third row in (12) with µy = µx = 0; the fourths, from simply operating; and















  = [py U0
2[c2(y)]]
2 U0















































1[w(y) − c2(y)]R1[w(y) − c2(y)] < 0 (19)
because U0(.) > 0, w(y) − c2(y) < w(x) − c2(x) < w(x) − c2(x),14 and utility functions
exhibit DARA, so that R1[w(y) − c2(y)] > R1[w(x) − c2(x)].










































1[w(y) − c2(y)] =





1[w(y) − c2(y)]R1[w(y) − c2(y)] < 0 (20)





































 = [U2[c2(y)] − U2[c2(x)]] py U0
2[c2(y)]U0














































 = −(1 − py)U0
2[c2(x)]py U0
2[c2(y)]px U00




  = −(1 − py)U0
2[c2(x)]py U0
2[c2(y)]p¯ x U00
1[w(¯ x) − c2(x)] > 0.
These follow from U0(.) > 0 and U00(.) < 0. QED
14The optimal sharing rule gives some insurance to both parties, for both are risk-averse. Appendix B




























 = (1 − py)U0
2[c2(x)]py U0
2[c2(y)] [U0
1[w(x) − c2(x)] − U0
1[w(¯ x) − c2(x)]] > 0





























0 0 py U0
2[c2(y)] (1 − py)U0
2[c2(x)]
0 0 −1 0
py U0
2[c2(y)] −1 h22 0
(1 − py)U0




































 = − [(1 − py)U0
2[c2(x)]]
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2[c2(x)]]









































 = 0. QED
B Proof of proposition 2
The commenda contract solves the relevant optimization problem under full information




E [U1[w(s) − c2(s)]]
s.t. E [U2[c2(s)]] = U2 (21)
w(s) − c2(s) ≥ 0 ∀s (22)
c2(s) ≥ 0 ∀s. (23)
Step 1. Show that all individually-rational eﬃcient allocations are characterized by
c2(y) < c2(x) < c2(¯ x)
42Let η and µs be the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers of restrictions (21) and (22) for each s,
respectively. Deﬁne the Lagrangian function for program 3 as








1[w(s) − c2(s)] + η psU0
2[c2(s)] − µs ≤ 0 c2(s) ≥ 0 c2(s)
∂£(.)
∂c2(s) = 0 ∀s
∂£(.)




∂µs = w(s) − c2(s) ≥ 0 µs ≥ 0 µs
∂£(.)
∂µs = 0 ∀s.
(24)
Let c2(s) > 0∀s, then complementary slackness in (24) ensures that
∂£(.)
∂c2(s) = 0. Then,
c2(y) < c2(x) because



























1[w(x)−c2(x)] ≥ 0 derives from operating the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions for µy ≥ 0 and µ1(x) = 0. From applying U0
i(.) > 0 and U00
i (.) < 0 to this
expression, it follows that optimal event-contingent consumption must satisfy c2(y) < c2(x).
The equality c2(x) = w(x) in the third expression derives from complementary slackness in
(24) with µ1(x) > 0; w(x) > w(y) by assumption; and w(y) ≥ c2(y) is restriction (22) for
s = y. Likewise, it can be proved that c2(x) < c2(¯ x).
The case c2(y) = c2(x) = c2(¯ x) = 0 lies in the contract curve, but does not satisfy the
participation constraint of agent 2. The case c2(s) = 0 and c2(s0) > 0 for s,s0 ∈ S and
s > s0 leads to contradiction.
Step 2. Show that all individually-rational eﬃcient allocations are characterized by
c2(y) = w(y) = k2 − k + y.
Assume they are not and, then, let (k2 −k + ˆ ty,k2 −k + ˆ tx,k2 −k + ˆ t¯ x) be the solution
of program 2, with ˆ ty 6= y. From imposing non-negative consumption, it follows that ˆ ty < y
43and it is possible to write
ˆ t
x = a + d
ˆ t
¯ x = ¯ a + d
with ¯ a 6= 0 6= a, E(a) = 0 and d =
p¯ x
px+p¯ x
ˆ t¯ x +
px
px+p¯ x
ˆ tx. For notational purposes, let us deﬁne
E [u1[τ(y),τ(x),τ(¯ x)]] = E [U1[s − τ(s)]] and E [u2[τ(y),τ(x),τ(¯ x)]] = E [U2[k2 − k + τ(s)]].
Let the event-contingent allocation (k2 −k +y,k2 −k + ˜ t,k2 −k + ˜ t) be the solution to





















Let also deﬁne (k2 −k +y,k2 −k +˜ tx,k2 −k +˜ t¯ x) as the solution to a restricted version of
program 3 in the sense that c2(y) = k2−k+y is imposed. If (k2−k+ˆ ty,k2−k+ˆ tx,k2−k+ˆ t¯ x)




y,a + d,¯ a + d]
i

















It can be proved that (26) leads to a contradiction and, therefore, the optimal allocation






















where the ﬁrst inequality derives from the utility function being concave and E(a) = 0.









y,a + d,¯ a + d]
i





where the inequality derives from the utility function being concave and E(a) = 0 and
the equalities are imposed by (25). The last inequality of (27) holds because the allocation
(k2 −k+y,k2 −k+˜ t,k2 −k+˜ t) could have been chosen—program 2 is a restricted version
of program 3— but it was not. Therefore, it must give less expected utility to agent 1 than
the optimally chosen allocation (k2 − k + y,k2 − k + ˜ tx,k2 − k + ˜ t¯ x).
Step 3. The individually-rational eﬃcient allocations of consumption
(k2 − k + y,k2 − k + ˜ t
x,k2 − k + ˜ t
¯ x)
can be sustained by a commenda contract establishing τ = −k, τ(y) = y, τ(x) = ˜ tx, and
τ(¯ x) = ˜ t¯ x. Just note that contracts are deﬁned such that c2(s) = k2 + τ + τ(s). QED
44C Proof of proposition 3 and lemma 1
The relevant problem when the merchant is initially endowed to fund the venture on his
own (k1 > k) becomes a restricted version of program 2 (under hidden information)or pro-
gram 3 (under full information) in which restriction (6) is added. The proof is developed
for the hidden information structure, but can be extended to full information easily.
Step 1: Show that c∗
2(y) > k2 − k + y.
When the entrepreneur lacks the wealth to ﬁnance his project in its entirety (k1 = 0),
subsection 3, and proposition 1 in particular, states the conditions under which the optimal
allocation is a binding solution with a positive Kuhn-Tucker multiplier µy associated with
the restriction w(y) − c2(y) ≥ 0. This means that for the (binding) solution (˜ c2(y),˜ c2(x)),
Υ(˜ c2(y),ϕ(˜ c2(y),λ1);λ1) > 0, (28)
where ˜ c2(y) = k2 − k + y and ˜ c2(x) = k2 − k + ˜ t, and λ1 represents parameter values
representing a risky and costly venture, and θ = 0, k1 = 0. From (28) and utility functions
exhibiting DARA, it follows that the allocation (˜ c2(y),˜ c2(x)) is not optimal for parameters
λ2 such that k1 > k either.
Lemma 2 Υ(˜ c2(y),˜ c2(x);λ2) > 0.


































1[w(x)−c2(x)] [R1[w(y) − c2(y)] − R1[w(x) − c2(x)]] > 0,
where the ﬁrst equality derives from simple derivation; the second one from applying the
deﬁnition of absolute risk-aversion coeﬃcient, R(z) = −
U00(z)
U0(z), and (17); the third equal-
ity derives from operating and the inequality from U0(.) > 0, U00(.) < 0 and the utility
function exhibiting DARA, with w(y) − c2(y) < w(x) − c2(x) < w(x) − c2(x), so that
45R1[w(y) − c2(y)] > R1[w(x) − c2(x)]. QED
Therefore, the optimal allocation is not (˜ c2(y),˜ c2(x)) but (c∗
2(y),c∗
2(x)) = (˜ c2(y) +
,˜ c2(x) − δ()), where diﬀerent values of  deﬁne distinct points in the core.
Lemma 3 There exists an  > 0 and a δ() > 0 such that all the restrictions are satisﬁed
and Υ(˜ c2(y) + ,˜ c2(x) − δ();λ2) = 0.
Proof of Lemma 3: The result follows from applying the sign of the following deriva-
tives to lemma 2.
∂Υ(c2(y),c2(x);λ)
∂c2(y) < 0 and
∂Υ(c2(y),c2(x);λ)
∂c2(x) > 0. The proof is straightforward.
Just ﬁnd the derivatives and note that U0(.) > 0 and U00(.) < 0. QED
Lemma 4 The contract curve for interior points, deﬁned by ϕ(c2(y),λ) for parameters λ2,
such that k1 > k > 0, lies below the contract curve for λ1, with k1 = 0: ϕ(c2(y),λ2) <
ϕ(c2(y),λ1) ∀c2(y).
Proof of Lemma 4: The Implicit Function Theorem also gives the ﬁrst-order compar-








< 0 ∀c2(y) in the restricted set, (29)
since U0(.) > 0, U00(.) < 0 and the utility functions exhibit decreasing absolute risk-aversion
(DARA). QED
Therefore, the optimal allocation establishes c∗
2(y) = k2 − k + y +  with  > 0.
Step 2: Show that c∗
2(y) < k2.
This follows from imposing the optimal sharing rule c∗
2(y) < c∗
2(x) to the ex-ante partic-
ipation constraint of agent 1 holding with equality and noting that all individually rational
allocations of agent 2’s consumption are upper-bounded by the ex- ante participation con-
straint of agent 1.
Let c1(y) = w(y) − c2(y) ≤ k1 − k + y, and, consequently, c2(y) ≥ (k1 + k2 − k +
y) − k1 + k − y = k2. Then, for E [U1[w(s) − c2(s)]] = E [U1[k1 − k + s]] to be satisﬁed,
c1(¯ x) = w(¯ x) − c2(x) > k1 − k + ¯ x. These, in turn, imply that c2(x) ≤ k2, which is in
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